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The Contents and Features of Dispute Settlement under US-Jordan FTA: An 
Appraisal 
 
Bashar H. Malkawi* 
 
I. Introduction 
 
       The U.S.-Jordan Free Trade Agreement (hereinafter US-JO FTA) was the first FTA 
to be concluded with an Arab country. Several reasons led the U.S. to negotiate a free 
trade agreement with Jordan. The failed WTO Ministerial Conference in 1999 lead U.S. 
trade officials to analyze the possibilities for a free trade agreement that would include 
certain provisions that are resisted at the multilateral trading level.1 Moreover, the U.S. 
and Jordan had signed a trade and investment framework in 1999, which is usually a 
precursor for a FTA.2  
       Jordan was also the right candidate for a FTA in terms of economics and politics. 
Economically, U.S. exports to Jordan would increase as a result of the FTA while 
Jordanian imports to the U.S. would not threaten U.S. industries.3 The FTA could also 
spur Jordan’s economic growth, allowing for the possibility that it would become less 
                                               
* Dean and Professor of Law, College of Law, University of Sharjah (contact: bmalkawi@sharjah.ac.ae). 
The author wishes to thank David Gantz and Padideh Ala'i for their indispensable comments and feedback 
they provided in connection with the preparation of this article. The author also would like to thank Zeina 
Ahmad for her research assistance. 
1 In the wake of protests by environmentalists and human rights activists at the WTO summit in Seattle in 
late 1999, then president Clinton promised to link future trade accords to labor, environmental, and human 
rights issues. See Eric M. Uslaner, The Democratic Party and Free Trade: An Old Romance Restored, 6 
NAFTA: L & Bus. Rev. Am. 347, 359 (2000). 
2 See Grary G. Yerkey, U.S., Jordan Sign Framework For Trade and Investment Pact, 16 Intl. Trade Rep. 
(BNA) 468 (Mar. 17, 1999) (then USTR Charlene Barshefsky stated that the agreement would put in place 
institutional foundation for trade relationship. The agreement opened dialogue on issues such as agriculture, 
intellectual property, services, investment, and trade-related aspects of labor and environmental policy). 
 3 A study conducted by the Office of Economics and the Office of Industries of the USITC, found that 
“Jordan’s exports to the U.S. would not have a measurable impact on U.S. industries, U.S. employment, 
and production. Based on 1999 trade figures, U.S. imports from Jordan totaled $31 million as compared to 
total US imports of $1 trillion. See U.S. International Trade Commission, Economic Impact on the United 
States of a U.S.-Jordan Free Trade Agreement, 5-1 Pub. No. 3340 (Sep. 2000) (an FTA with Jordan is not 
expected to have a measurable impact on U.S. imports from Jordan for the 15 sectors reviewed. For one 
sector, textiles and apparels, a likely rise in U.S. imports of apparel is expected to have a negligible effect 
on total U.S. imports). 
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dependant on foreign aid. Moreover, the U.S. needed to negotiate a FTA because it was 
losing ground to the EC which, which had concluded association agreements with several 
Mediterranean countries.4 By signing the FTA, the U.S. could catch up to the EC with 
respect to economic dominance in Arab countries.  
       Politically, the FTA reflects the U.S.’s appreciation for Jordan’s role in the Middle 
East peace process and cooperation with international counter-terrorism activities. In 
addition, the FTA signals to other Arab countries the benefits to maintain peace. 
Economic growth will also enhance political stability and encourage peace in the Middle 
East.5 For its part, the U.S. would be able to market Jordan’s economic growth as a 
product of Jordan’s peaceful relationship with its neighbors, especially Israel. In other 
words, a wealthy Jordan is good for Israel.6 So long as Jordan remains poor its citizens, 
who are mostly Palestinians, will continue to blame their poverty on Israel. Therefore, the 
FTA would also help alleviate the pressure on Israel and reduce its security risk. 
                                               
4 The official movement towards a closer relationship between the EC and its Mediterranean neighbors was 
launched at a meeting of the European Council in Lisbon in 1992. It takes place between the EC and 12 
countries to the east and south of the Mediterranean. The major premise of the partnership is to create an 
enormous zone of free trade between Europe and several countries of the Middle East. The Euro-
Mediterranean Partnership was created in 1995 in Barcelona with the signing of the Barcelona Declaration 
by the EC and 12 Mediterranean Countries. The 12 Mediterranean countries are as follows: Morocco, 
Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt, Jordan, Israel, The Palestinian Authority, Lebanon, Syria, Cyprus, Malta, and 
Turkey. This partnership will lead to a series of Euro-Mediterranean association agreements. See 
Jacqueline Klosek, The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, 8 Intl. Leg. Persp. 173 (1996). 
5 See Bashar Malkawi, Securing Peace through Trade Dividends: Qualifying Industrial Zones between the 
U.S, Israel, Jordan, and Egypt, 13 Currents: International Trade Law Journal 3, 5 (2004). See also David 
Gantz, Introduction to U.S. Free Trade Agreements, 5 British Journal of American Legal Studies 300, 308 
(2016). 
6 Of particular importance are the opportunities the agreement potentially provides Palestinians living in 
Jordan. For these individuals, nearly all of whom at present live in poverty and have little chance to 
improve their lives, FTA changes the equation and offers real hope. Significantly, it offers a tangible 
alternative to violence. President Kennedy who said "trade, not aid." See Sen. Comm. on Finance, Hearing 
on Jordan Free Trade Agreement, 107th Cong. 1st Sess. (Mar. 20, 2001) (statement of Sen. Bingaman). 
That view is held by Israeli Prime Minister Sharon, who, on his first visit to Washington as prime minister, 
urged Congress to pass this historic trade agreement. 
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       On June 6, 2000, King Abdullah II and then President Clinton declared that the U.S. 
and Jordan would launch negotiations for a free trade agreement.7 The US-JO FTA was 
signed in a record time on October 24, 2000.8 It was the first FTA to be concluded in the 
absence of fast track authority, which had lapsed since 1994.9 Without fast track 
authority, congressional approval for the FTA would be subject to regular procedures. 
       The US-JO FTA is comprised of a preamble, nineteen articles, three annexes, joint 
statements, memorandums of understanding, and side letters. The preamble of the US-JO 
FTA lists the aims of the agreement. For example, the FTA partners desire to further the 
historic bonds of friendship between them.10 
       Articles 15, 16, and 17 of the US-JO FTA are related to the dispute settlement 
mechanism.11 Theses articles provide an umbrella under which any dispute may be 
resolved. The provisions apply to all legal disputes arising from the FTA, with the 
                                               
7 See Gary G. Yerkey, U.S., Jordan Make “Substantial” Progress in Talks on Free Trade Agreement, 
USTR Says, 17 Intl. Trade Rep. (BNA) 1224 (Aug. 3, 2000) (stating agreement to initiate negotiations was 
announced by U.S. officials following a meeting between President Clinton and King Abdullah on June 6 
in Washington, D.C.).  
8 This record time of approximately four months can be compared with the 15 months of intensive debate 
between the U.S. and Israel which resulted in the conclusion of the US-Israel FTA. See Andrew James 
Samet & Moshe Goldberg, The U.S.-Israel Free Trade Area Agreement 1.02 (Bus. L. 1989). NAFTA 
parties completed negotiations in 1992 after 14 months of negotiations. 
 9 The fast track authority is a procedure, delegated by the U.S. Congress, gives the U.S. executive the 
authority to enter into trade negotiations under certain procedural requirements. It was used to conclude the 
Tokyo Round of 1979, the US-Israel FTA of 1985 whereby a specific section (section 401) of the U.S. 
Trade and Tariff Act of 1984 was designed as "trade with Israel", the US-Canada FTA of 1988, NAFTA of 
1993, and the Uruguay Multilateral Trade Round of 1994. For more on fast track authority see I.M Destler, 
Renewing Fast-Track Legislation 8 (Inst. Intl. Econ. 1997).  
10 See United States (U.S.)-Jordan: Agreement Between The United States of America and the Hashemite 
Kingdom of Jordan on The Establishment of a Free Trade Area, Oct. 24, 2000, 41 I. L. M. 63 (entered into 
force Dec. 17, 2001), preamble. 
11 Articles 17 (Joint Committee), 18 (Notice and Consultation), and 19 (Dispute Settlements) of the US-
Israel FTA are related to the dispute settlement mechanism. Chapter 20 of NAFTA (Institutional 
Arrangements and Dispute Settlement Procedures) covers disputes settlement under the agreement.  
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exception of matters involving services, which is found in article 3, and intellectual 
property rights, which is found in article 4.12  
       The following discussion analyzes the dispute settlement mechanism provided for by 
the US-JO FTA.13 The article begins in section II with a brief introduction on the 
functioning of FTAs. Section III highlights the importance of including dispute resolution 
provisions in FTAs. Section IV analyzes the controlling procedure with respect to 
disputes includes: the Joint Committee of the FTA; standard of review; establishment and 
composition of panels; application and range of resolutions for disputes; panel report; 
transparency; forum shopping; the effect of rulings or recommendations; and 
implementation issues. Section V discusses the special dispute settlement rules for labor 
and environmental disputes. Section VI assesses the use of dispute resolution mechanism 
under the US-JO FTA. The article concludes by proposing improvements to the US-JO 
FTA dispute resolution mechanism and additions to its existing provisions.   
 
 
                                               
12 Subparagraph 17.4.a of the FTA provides “A Party may invoke a panel under paragraph 1.c of this 
Article for claims arising under Article 3 [services] only to the extent that a claim arises with regard to a 
commitment that is inscribed in the Party’s Services Schedule to Annex 3.1 to this Agreement, but is not 
inscribed in the Party’s Schedule of specific commitments annexed to GATS. Such commitment may 
include a market access or national treatment commitment in a sector, a horizontal commitment applicable 
to a sector, or additional commitment”. Additionally, subparagraph 17.4.b provides “Except as otherwise 
agreed by the Parties, a Party may invoke a panel under paragraph 1.c of this Article for claims arising 
under Article 4 [intellectual property] only to the extent that the same claim would not be subject to 
resolution through the WTO Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of 
Disputes”.   
13 A comparison, whenever necessary, is made with the U.S.-Israel Free Trade Agreement ("US-Israel 
FTA") and other U.S. FTAs' with Arab countries such as Oman, Bahrain, and Morocco. These FTAs were 
chosen for the purposes of analysis because the U.S. signed FTAs' only with Israel, a next-door neighbor, 
and other Arab countries in the region. In addition, reference will be made to WTO agreements and panel 
decisions. See United States-Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, Apr. 29, 1996, WTO 
Doc. No. WT/DS2/AB/R, at 17 (that direction reflects a measure of recognition that the General Agreement 
is not to be read in “clinical isolation” from public international law).  See also JOOST PAUWELYN, 
CONFLICT OF NORMS IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL: HOW WTO LAW RELATES TO OTHER 
RULES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 25-40 (2003) (stating that no academic author, WTO decision or 
document dispute that WTO rules are part of the wider corpus of public international law). 
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II. Global Economics and FTAs 
 
       International trade constitutes a vital lynchpin of the global governance architecture 
with staggering trillions of U.S. dollars worth of annual trade.14 The global trade order 
consists of trade policies and systems – in particular FTAs – which have played an 
increasingly crucial role in the infrastructure of global governance and substantially 
impacting international economic development and strategic affairs.15  The trade 
infrastructure is inextricably linked with global financial institutions and power politics 
and intertwined with military and political alliances.16  
       In recent decades, global economic governance has promoted free trade and trade 
liberalization through regional trade agreements (RTAs) to improve economic welfare of 
which FTAs form the overwhelming majority of agreements. 17 FTAs have been 
perceived as stoking global economic growth as well fostering vigorous economic 
benefits to trade partners and gained in popularity following the failures to implement 
                                               
14 In 2016, there was U.S. $20 trillion worth of global trade in goods and services.  See WTO, World Trade 
Statistical Review, available at <https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/statis_e/wts2016_e/wts2016_e.pdf>, 18 
(2016).      
15 See Joel Slawotsky, The Clash of Architects: Impending Developments and Transformations in 
International Law, 3 The Chinese Journal of Global Governance (2017) (International trade agreements 
may encompass broader, geopolitical and concerns global governance contexts have always played a role in 
investment treaty law) 
16 Helen Milner, The Political Economy of International Trade, 2 Annu. Rev. Polit. Sci. 105, 118 (1999). 
Power politics matters in the global trade paradigm as powerful states may violate their trade commitments 
toward weaker trading partners, knowing that weaker states are unlikely to carry out retaliation against 
them. See Anu Bradford & Eric A. Posner, Universal Exceptionalism in International Law, 52 Harvard 
International Law Journal 3, 11 (2011). 
17 See Chankwon Bae and Yong Joon Jang, The Impact of Free Trade Agreements on Foreign Direct 
Investment: The Case of Korea, 17 Journal of East Asian Economic Integration 417, 423(2013) (In 
particular, free trade agreements (FTAs) [], account for 90% of the total number of RTAs.) See also Bashar 
H. Malkawi, Rules of origin under US Trade Agreements with Arab countries: Are they Helping and 
Hindering Free Trade? 10 Journal of International Trade Law and Policy 29, 33 (rules of origin in 
some FTAs are complex and protectionist and may act as barriers to trade).  
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World Trade Organization modifications post-Doha leading to proliferation of FTAs in 
the early 2000s .18  
       FTAs are contractual obligations between the parties to reduce or eliminate tariffs 
and other trade restrictions on imports and a wide array of economic sectors.19 The goals 
of FTAs are to promote cross-border trade and investment and provide a stimulus to the 
economy of the trade partners. FTAs arise from perceptions between trading partners that 
an FTA would benefit the partners by – at a minimum – reducing or eliminating trade 
barriers and tariffs and establishing rules with respect to what constitutes a product 
manufactured within the FTA i.e. rules of origin.20  
       There are many benefits ascribed to FTAs such as vigorous global trade and 
encouraging efficient allocation of resources, enhanced consumer options and overall 
lower economic costs. FTAs are widely acknowledged as promoting trade liberalization 
and access to markets creating a more dynamic economic environment. Trade is 
considered as an important catalyst of economic growth. Trade promotes more efficient 
and effective production of goods and services to the countries which have comparative 
                                               
18 See Masahiro Kawai and Ganeshan Wignaraja, Free Trade Agreements in East Asia: A Way toward 
Trade Liberalization? Available at <https://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/publication/28490/adb-briefs-
2010-1-free-trade-agreements.pdf>  (2010) (The inability to conclude the World Trade Organization 
(WTO) Doha Development Round has spawned a proliferation of bilateral and plurilateral free trade 
agreements (FTAs) across the globe)  See also Hitoshi Sato, and Ikumo Isono, Impacts of Free Trade 
Agreements on Business Activity in Asia: The Case of Japan Daisuke Hirastuka, available at 
<https://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/publication/155998/adbi-wp143.pdf> p.2 (2009) page 2 (Efforts to 
liberalize global trade through the World Trade Organization (WTO) have made limited progress since the 
Doha round of negotiations was launched in 2001…. [The] disappointing consequences have forced the 
WTO member countries (US and EU in particular) to choose alternative paths such as FTAs to promote 
trade. The trend toward FTAs has generated a domino effect in which one FTA triggers the creation of 
others). See also Julien Chaisse and Mitsuo Matsushita, Maintaining the WTO's Supremacy in the 
International Trade Order: A Proposal to Refine and Revise the Role of the Trade Policy Review 
Mechanism, 16 Journal of International Economic Law 9, 18-20 (2013). 
19 See, e.g., Korea FTA chs. 3, 7, 11, 12, and 18, 46 I.L.M. 642 (2007). 
20 William H. Cooper, Free Trade Agreements: Impact on U.S. Trade and Implications for U.S. Trade 
Policy, p.2-4 (2014), available at <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL31356.pdf> (Rules of origin prevent 
products from nonmembers entering an FTA market over the lowest tariff wall. Most FTAs also include 
procedures on the settlement of disputes arising among members and rules on the implementation of border 
controls, such as product safety certification and sanitary and phytosanitary requirements) 
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advantage in producing them.21 The economic benefits of FTAs are so well-recognized 
that even on an individual business person level, let alone company level, there is a 
strong interest in pursuing FTAs.22 FTAs could also provide other less tangible benefits. 
The signing of FTAs not only signifies economic cooperation between nations, but also 
cooperation on the political and institutional fronts.23 
       Indeed, expert economic consensus is that free trade fosters wealth gains and raises 
living standards. Moreover, in addition to economic benefits, FTAs have been viewed 
favorably as a tool of broad strategic goals.24 Therefore, in an effort to expand export, 
promote employment and wealth creation, almost every country has attached great 
significance to FTAs, which are regarded as an important approach to promote national 
economy and trade development. Most WTO member countries have signed at least one 
FTA.   
       The surging movement of foreign direct investment (FDI) across borders is a 
significant outcome of globalization and is an important component of economic growth. 
FDI is considered a pillar of economic stability and growth and FTAs are widely 
                                               
21 See Najabat Ali, Li Xialing, Foreign Direct Investment, International Trade and Economic Growth in 
Pakistan’s Economic Perspective, 7.5 American Journal of Economics 211-215 (2017).  
22 See Jeffrey J. Schott, Free Trade Agreements: The Cost of U.S. Nonparticipation, Testimony before the 
Subcommittee on Trade. House Ways and Means Committee (March 29, 2001) (arguing that to counter the 
fact that FTAs are rapidly forming in which the United States is not a participant, the US must vigorously 
negotiate FTAs or risk harming US interests). 
23 See S. M. Thangavelu and C. Findlay, The Impact of Free Trade Agreements on Foreign Direct 
Investment in the Asia-Pasific Region, in Findlay, C. (ed.), ASEAN+1 FTAs and Global Value Chains in 
East Asia, ERIA Research Project Report 2010-29 (2011).  
24 Interestingly, the U.S. had arrived relatively late to the conclusion that regional trade agreements were a 
desirable and even necessary element of a comprehensive trade liberalization policy. Throughout multiple 
GATT negotiating rounds designed to achieve global tariff and non-tariff barrier reductions, at least 
through the Tokyo Round (1973-79), the United States remained a strong supporter of the multilateral 
trading system. The shift toward Regional Trade Agreements (RTAs) began only in the mid-1980s. see 
David A. Gantz, supra note 5, at 305.  
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understood as a proximate cause of increasing FDI.25 Political legitimacy and binding 
nature of these FTAs help to create a more secure political and institutional environment 
for multinational corporations to invest, thereby increasing FDI flows. FTAs are also 
important during global financial problems as FTAs serve to keep trade and FDI flowing, 
even when crises strike.26 
       FTAs and free trade are not without criticism. Although the essential construct of 
FTAs is tariff and barrier elimination, more recent FTAs are more ambitious and include 
chapters on investment rules and intellectual property rights in a way that go beyond what 
is covered by the GATT/WTO.27 In addition, opposing economists claim that FTAs are 
inferior to the WTO order and they undermine the multilateral trading system.28 
       A major criticism of FTAs arises from the inherent technology transfer and flow of 
investment capital across borders. Critics point to the purported "greater benefit to the 
partner nation than to the United States" to claim FTAs such as NAFTA enable some 
nations to exploit the FTA and partners to be a 'trade sucker".29 Some FTAs such as 
NAFTA depresses wages, result in lost jobs and sharpens national income inequality.30  
                                               
25 FTAs are increasingly being used as instruments to promote political diplomacy. Thangavelu, S. M. and 
C. Findlay, supra note 23, at 114.  
26 See Masahiro Kawai and Ganeshan Wignaraja, Free Trade Agreements in East Asia: A Way toward 
Trade Liberalization? 1 Asian Development Bank Briefs 4 (2010).  
27 See Vergano R. Paolo and Tobias Dolle, Free Trade Agreements and Regulatory Change: Examples 
from the Generic and Biosimilar Sectors, 51 Journal of World Trade 205, 208 (2017). 
28 International economists such as Jagdish Bhagwati and Anne O. Krueger strongly advocate that the U.S. 
and other national governments should not pursue FTAs at the expense of multilateral negotiations in the 
WTO. FTAs are by definition discriminatory and therefore trade diverting. See William H. Cooper, Free 
Trade Agreements: Impact on U.S. Trade and Implications for U.S. Trade Policy Specialist in International 
Trade and Finance 11 (2014). 
 
29 The counter-argument is that while benefits may indeed flow to a partner nation, this does not translate 
into the United States being a “sucker.” See Gary Clyde Hufbauer, Cathleen Cimino, and Tyler Moran, 
NAFTA at 20: Misleading Charges and Positive Achievements 18 (May 2014) (At the launch of a free trade 
agreement (FTA), US trade barriers are almost always lower than the barriers of a prospective partner 
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       Another avenue of criticism is that FTAs may adversely impact human rights and 
labor rights.31 FTAs should not stomp on human rights and there should be no 
interference into the domestic regulation of budgetary, health, environmental and other 
public policies. 
III. The Importance of Dispute Settlement Provisions in FTAs 
        
       It is assumed that the parties to the FTA will carry out their commitments in good 
faith. Persons and companies would risk capital and may suffer potential loss; therefore 
FTAs require a strong legal foundation incentivizing stability, transparency and 
compliance with obligations. Legal guarantees and the knowledge disputes will be fairly 
adjudicated with appropriate remedies is the cornerstone of encouraging FTA 
utilization.32 To provide the inducement, FTAs provide that failure to comply with FTA 
obligations may trigger the dispute resolution mechanism and result in retaliatory 
measures or a claim for damages or the imposition of a fine or other negative 
consequence.33 Even if no disputes are expected, dispute settlement provisions in a FTA 
                                                                                                                                            
country. Why? Because, unlike many countries, the United States has progressively trimmed its trade 
barriers for 70 years, since the end of the Second World War. Lower US trade barriers at the launch of the 
agreement were true of the Canada-US FTA (CUSFTA) in 1989; NAFTA, which added Mexico in 1994; 
the US-Chile FTA in 2004; the US-Australia FTA in 2005; the US-Peru FTA in 2009; the US-Korea FTA 
in 2012; and others. Since the goal of any FTA is to reduce the trade barriers of both partners to zero, the 
US partner almost always has further to go….FTAs also lower nontariff barriers (NTBs, for example, 
quotas and regulatory obstacles) in both partners. Extensive research shows that, like tariffs, NTBs are 
generally higher in the partner country when an FTA is launched. Again, the partner has further to go. So, 
just looking at negotiated FTA texts, it is “Uncle Smart,” not “Uncle Sucker.”) 
30 Id. 
31 See Meredith Kolsky Lewis, Human Rights Provisions in Free Trade Agreements: Do the Ends Justify 
the Means? 12 Loy. U. Chi. Int'l L. Rev. 1, 6-8 (2014). 
32 The way in which an international treaty ensures that its signatories actually comply with their treaty 
obligations is one of the critical factors determining the effectiveness and efficiency of the treaty. See 
Abram Chayes and Antonia Handler Chayes, The New Sovereignty; Compliance with International 
Regulatory Agreements 3-4 (1995). 
33 See for example NAFTA chs. 11, 20, Can.-Mex.-U.S., Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 289 and 605 (1993); 
Korea FTA chs. 11, 22. 
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reinforce commitments of parties and assure investors that the FTA provides a solid 
ground for investment. 
       The dispute settlement mechanism in FTAs is necessary as they provide means to 
settle disagreements on interpretation or compliance with treaty obligations. The dispute 
settlement mechanism help ease tensions among FTA parties and maintain healthy 
relationships among trading partners.34 To put is differently, dispute settlement provisions 
in FTAs provide an organized way for its members to settle disputes otherwise lingering 
disputes can harm bilateral relations and reduce the FTAs' benefits. 
       In addition to preventing spillovers of disputes, dispute resolution mechanism is 
considered crucial tool to provide an authoritative interpretation of the rules and norms of 
a treaty.35 This can enhance commitments of the parties and legitimacy of the FTA itself. 
Ultimately, the existence of dispute resolution mechanism in FTAs is fundamental to the 
process of economic integration as it facilitates a deeper and wider integration by 
providing an institutional framework of jurisprudence to develop and increase access to 
justice by members of the FTA.36 
       The existence of dispute resolution mechanism shifts the balance in FTAs from 
power-oriented to rule-oriented legal systems.37 In recent years, a large amount of 
criticism has been leveled against dispute settlement mechanisms in FTAs. For example, 
FTAs in general, and their dispute resolution provisions in particular, are seen as a means 
by which developed countries to export their laws into the other countries that are party 
                                               
34 Dispute resolution mechanism can reduce the number of economic and political disputes that could lead 
to military conflict. See E.D. Mansfield and B.M. Pollins (eds.), Economic Interdependence and 
International Conflict: New Perspectives on an Enduring Debate 222-224 (2003). See also Yuval Shany, 
The Competing Jurisdictions of International Courts and Tribunals 3-5 (2003). 
35 See Abram Chayes and Antonia Handler Chayes, supra note 27, at 24.  
36 See David Simmons, Caribbean Court of Justice: A Unique Institution of Caribbean Creativity, 29 Nova 
L. Rev. 171, 177-178 (2005). 
37 See John H. Jackson, The World Trading System, 110-11 (2ed., 1997). 
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to the FTAs.38 Furthermore, dispute settlement provisions are considered as overriding 
domestic court systems and sovereignty.39 Despite the criticism leveled against dispute 
resolution mechanisms, their presence in FTAs is of paramount importance in providing 
stability and incentive for parties to engage in trade. If dispute settlement mechanism fails 
at encouraging trade, FTAs will not be as successful as the potential. Thus, the dispute 
settlement mechanism is an important or perhaps even overriding focus in the 
establishment of FTAs. 
IV. The US-JO FTA Dispute Settlement Mechanism 
 
A. The Joint Committee of the US-JO FTA 
 
       Articles 15 and 16 of the US-JO FTA emphasize the settlement of disputes through 
consultations. The US-JO FTA establishes a permanent body, called the Joint Committee, 
to review the implementation of the FTA.40 The Joint Commission is comprised of 
cabinet level representatives or their delegates; for the U.S it is USTR and for Jordan 
Minister of Trade and Industry.41 
       The Joint Commission's responsibilities go well beyond dispute settlement, and 
include: reviewing the general functioning of the agreement and the results of the 
agreement from experience gained during its functioning, considering and adopting any 
amendment or modification to the agreement subject to the domestic legal requirements 
of each party, and developing guidelines, explanatory materials, rules on the proper 
implementation of the agreement, and discussing the review performed by each part as to 
                                               
38 See Mark B. Baker, No Country Left Behind; Exporting of U.S. Legal Norms Under the Guise of 
Economic Integration, 19 Emory Int’l L. Rev. 1321, 1324 (2005). 
39 See Josh Wingrove and Eric Martin, Canada, Mexico may Keep Nafta Investor Dispute System without 
U.S, available a t<https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-01-25/canada-mexico-may-keep-nafta-
dispute-resolution-without-u-s> (January 25, 2018).  
40 See United States (U.S.)-Jordan: Agreement Between The United States of America and the Hashemite 
Kingdom of Jordan on The Establishment of a Free Trade Area, supra n. 10, art. 15. 
41 Id. art. 15.3.a. 
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the environmental effects of the FTA.42 The Joint Commission is also authorized to 
establish and delegate responsibilities to ad hoc and standing committees or working 
groups, and seek the advice of non-governmental persons or groups.43 In summary, the 
Joint Committee has a vast authority to review all issues pertinent to the US-JO FTA. The 
Joint Commission does not pose a threat to national sovereignty and there is no danger of 
too much intervention in markets. The Joint Committee is not supranational body with 
delegation of power from governments of either the U.S. or Jordan, thereby usurping 
their functions. The Joint Committee conducts a stock-taking exercise. 
       Most importantly, for purposes of this article, the Joint Committee plays a 
conciliatory role in the dispute settlement process, and any consultation to resolve a 
dispute that arises under the FTA must pass through this committee.44 According to the 
FTA, any dispute that is not resolved through a bilateral consultation may be referred to 
the Joint Committee.45 However, there are several issues that arise concerning the details 
of the involvement of the Joint Committee in settling the dispute. For example, views of 
the parties who are members of the Joint Committee may not achieve consensus. 
Furthermore, the interpretation of the Joint Committee may not conform to the relevant 
rules of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.46 An interpreter of the US-JO 
                                               
42 Id. art. 15.2. 
43 Id. art. 15.3.b. 
44 Id. art. 15.2.c. 
45 Id. 17.1.b. 
46 The context for the purpose of the interpretation of a treaty shall comprise, in addition to the text, 
including its preamble and annexes:  
(a) any agreement relating to the treaty which was made between all the parties in connexion with the 
conclusion of the treaty;  
(b) any instrument which was made by one or more parties in connexion with the conclusion of the treaty 
and accepted by the other parties as an instrument related to the treaty. 
3. There shall be taken into account, together with the context:  
(a) any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the interpretation of the treaty or the 
application of its provisions;  
(b) any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the agreement of the parties 
 13 
FTA should analyze the text in honesty, fairness and reasonableness, adopting a literal or 
textual interpretation of the FTA's words, and in light of the intentions of the FTA's 
drafters.47 These issues are left unanswered in the US-JO FTA. 
       In over 15 years since the signing of the FTA, the Joint Committee has met 
regularly.48 The Joint Committee has discussed ways to promote bilateral trade and 
commercial ties including in agricultural trade, customs, labor, and investment 
promotion, as well as regional and multilateral trade. The Joint Committee has been 
successful in following up with issues related to the FTA including complaints.49 
B. Initiating the Dispute Settlement Process 
       Consultations provide an opportunity for the parties to gather information and clarify 
facts.50 Consultations also save costs and time by settling disputes amicably rather than 
referring the matter to dispute panels.  
       The US-JO FTA parties are required to exert every effort to settle any contentious 
matter through consultations, which are intended to be cooperative and negotiated in 
                                                                                                                                            
regarding its interpretation;  
(c) any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the parties. 
4. A special meaning shall be given to a term if it is established that the parties so intended. Moreover, 
article 32 is related to the supplementary means of interpretation. It states that recourse may be had to 
supplementary means of interpretation, including the preparatory work of the treaty and the circumstances 
of its conclusion, in order to confirm the meaning resulting from the application of article 31, or to 
determine the meaning when the interpretation according to article 31:  
(a) leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure; or  
(b) leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable. 
 See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (May 23, 1969), 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, art.31.  
47 An interpreter is not free to adopt a reading that would result in reducing whole clauses or paragraphs of 
a treaty to redundancy or inutility. See Appellate Body, Japan-Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, 
WT/DS8/AB/R, at 12 (Oct. 4, 1996). 
48 See U.S. and Jordan Convene Free Trade Agreement Joint Committee, U.S. Embassy in Amman (May 
26, 2016) (The United States and Jordan convened the 7th session of the Joint Committee of the United 
States-Jordan Free Trade Agreement last Thursday at the Ministry of Industry, Trade and Supply). 
49 See Liza Casabona, U.S. Sends Delegation to Jordan to Discuss Labor Issues (Oct. 1, 2009), available at 
< https://www.citizenstrade.org/ctc/wp-
content/uploads/2011/05/20091001_senatedelegationtojordan_wwd.pdf >. 
50 The US-Bahrain FTA provides that each party shall provide sufficient information in the consultations to 
enable a full examination of how the matter subject to consultations might affect the operation of the FTA. 
See US-Bahrain FTA, infra 52, art.19.5.2. 
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nature, rather than adversarial and litigious.51 At this point no panel actually exists, and, 
therefore, there is no panel to which a dispute may be referred. Any party can request 
these consultations.52  
       The scope of consultation is broad enough to cover "any matter" affecting the 
operation or interpretation of the US-JO FTA.53 However, the US-JO FTA does not 
determine whether a consultation request can include both existing and proposed 
measures. 
       The FTA provides for a procedural requirement related to the consultation request. In 
particular, the FTA requires a written consultation request.54 The FTA stipulates the 
elapse of certain period of time – sixty days from submission of consultation request- 
before taking other measures such as referring the matter to the Joint Committee.55 In 
contrast with other FTAs between the U.S. and other Arab countries, the US-JO FTA 
does not provide accelerated consultation period for cases involving perishable goods.56 
Perishable goods may include agricultural or fish products that can lose value in short 
period of time. Therefore, accelerated consultation period is needed.  
       The US-JO FTA requires that each party affords the other party adequate opportunity 
for consultations, prompt reply to the request for consultations, and good faith in 
                                               
51 The parties shall at all times endeavor to agree on the interpretation and application of this Agreement, 
and shall make every attempt to arrive at mutually satisfactory resolution of any matter that affects the 
operation of the agreement. United States (U.S.)-Jordan: Agreement Between The United States of 
America and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan on The Establishment of a Free Trade Area, supra n. 10, 
art. 16.1. 
52 Id. art. 16.2. 
53 Id. 
54 Id. art.17.1.b. 
55 Id. 
56 The US-Bahrain FTA provides a 20 day period for consultations in case of perishable goods. See US-
Bahrain FTA, infra note 52, art.19.6. See also US-Morocco FTA, infra note 52, art.20.6. See also US-
Oman FTA, infra note 52, art.20.6. 
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negotiating.57 These requirements are mandated to ensure that each party has the chance 
to present its views and accommodate a solution within reasonable period of time with 
open minds to reach such a goal.  
1. Causes of Action 
 
       Article 17 of the FTA provides for a formal dispute settlement mechanism if other 
methods fail to resolve the matter at issue. The FTA provides the basis of the dispute 
settlement mechanism and grounds for review.58 The FTA provides for the 
comprehensive coverage of matters that could fall under the dispute settlement 
mechanism. One party can bring an action against the other if a dispute arises concerning 
the interpretation of the FTA, either party has failed to carry out its obligations under the 
FTA, or any party considers measures taken by the other party as severely distorts the 
balance of trade benefits or substantially undermine fundamental objectives of the 
agreement.59 The determination of whether a party has failed to carry out its obligations 
under the FTA depends on the judgment of the other party bringing the claim.   
                                               
57 See United States (U.S.)-Jordan: Agreement Between The United States of America and the Hashemite 
Kingdom of Jordan on The Establishment of a Free Trade Area, supra n. 10, art. 16.2. 
58 The basis of a dispute under the US-JO FTA is related to the interpretation of the agreement, if either 
party has failed to carry out its obligations under the agreement, or any party considers measures taken by 
the other party as severely distorts the balance of trade benefits or substantially undermine fundamental 
objectives of the agreement. Id. art. 17.1.a. 
59 Id. art. 17.1.a. The U.S. FTAs with Oman and Morocco include two types of dispute settlement: disputes 
between parties to the FTAs, and investor-state disputes applicable to claims by an investor of one party 
against the other party for breach of the FTAs investment obligation. See U.S.-Oman Free Trade 
Agreement (2006), arts. 10 & 20.2, available at < 
https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/uploads/agreements/fta/oman/asset_upload_file411_8841.pdf>. See also 
U.S.-Morocco FTA (2004), arts. 10 & 20.2, available at < 
https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/uploads/agreements/fta/morocco/asset_upload_file651_3838.pdf>. 
Neither the US- JO FTA nor the US-Bahrain FTA contains an investment chapter. See U.S-Bahrain FTA 
(2006), available at < https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/bahrain-fta/final-text>.  
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       The FTA covers violation and non-violation cases.60 In non-violation case, a party 
can bring a case where the other party takes an action that severely distorts the balance of 
trade benefits or undermine the fundamental objectives of the FTA.61 Even if the one 
party to the FTA takes an action that is consistent with the letter of the FTA, the other 
party may still claim that that action is inconsistent with the spirit of the agreement and 
thus severely distort the balance of trade benefits. Therefore, the non-violation cases 
broaden the scope of the dispute settlement process. The US-JO FTA non-violation 
clause intends to protect the opportunities that the FTA provides. It is noticed that the 
non-violation provision in the US-JO FTA covers all provisions in the FTA.62 In other 
U.S. FTAs with Arab countries, non-violation cases are specified for certain chapters 
                                               
60 The cause of action known in GATT and WTO parlance as a 'non-violation' complaint alleges the 
nullification or impairment of any benefit accruing to a Member directly or indirectly under a covered 
agreement, whether it conflicts with the provisions of a WTO agreement or not. See Matthew Kennedy, 
WTO Dispute Settlement and the TRIPS Agreement: Applying Intellectual Property Standards in a Trade 
Law Framework 352- 360 (2016).  
61 See United States (U.S.)-Jordan: Agreement Between The United States of America and the Hashemite 
Kingdom of Jordan on The Establishment of a Free Trade Area, supra n. 10, art. 17.1.a.iii. The language of 
this article is borrowed from article XXIII.b of GATT 1994. However, article XXIII.b of GATT uses 
“nullification and impairment” language. Thus, it seems that the GATT language imposes a lower bar since 
a measure can nullify or impair a benefit though not severely distort the balance of trade benefits. In 
considering the application of the non-violation provision, it is important to note that it must be interpreted 
narrowly as set under GATT practice. In order to make a successful claim under the non-violation 
provision, a FTA party must demonstrate the following elements: (1) taking of a measure by another party, 
(2) a benefit accruing under the FTA, and (3) sever distortion of the benefit or substantial undermining of 
the fundamental objectives of the FTA resulting from taking of the measure. The GATT panel in the 
oilseed case recognized that article XXIII:1(b) serves mainly to protect the balance of tariff concessions. 
Furthermore, it confirmed that the non-violation nullification or impairment remedy should be approached 
with caution and treated as an exceptional concept. The panel justified its reasoning on the ground that the 
idea underlying article XXIII is that the improved competitive opportunities that can legitimately be 
expected from a tariff concession can be frustrated not only by measures prohibited by the GATT but also 
by measures consistent with GATT. See GATT Panel Report, European Economic Community-Payments 
and Subsidies Paid to Processors and Producers of Oilseeds and Related Animal-Feed Proteins, Jan. 25, 
1990, GATT B.I.S.D. (37th Supp.) at 86 (1991). Non-violation cases not only covers tariff concessions but 
also other cases. See GATT Panel Report, United States- Restrictions on the Importation of Sugar and 
Sugar- Containing Products Applied Under the 1955 Waiver and Under the Headnote to the Schedule of 
Tariff Concessions, Nov. 7, 1990, GATT B.I.S.D. (37th Supp.) at 228, para. 5.21 (1990).  
62 This is similar to the US-Israel FTA. See U.S.-Israel Free Trade Agreement, Apr. 22, 1983, 24 I.L.M. 
657, art.19.1.a. 
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especially those related to national treatment and market access for goods, rules of origin, 
government procurement, cross-border trade in service, and intellectual property.63       
       Unlike other U.S. FTAs which included provisions on antidumping and 
countervailing duties, antidumping and countervailing are excluded implicitly from the 
coverage of the US-JO FTA.64 This could be interpreted that the U.S. did not want to 
subject its disciplines on antidumping or countervailing duties to scrutiny of a panel 
under the FTA. In other words, the U.S. did not want a binational panel to replace 
domestic courts examining antidumping or countervailing determinations. The only trade 
remedy provision found in the US-JO FTA is related only to safeguard measures.65 
However, safeguard measures are intended to address import surge as a result of tariff 
elimination but not to address injury to domestic industry. In this case, antidumping and 
countervailing become shelter for import competition. 
                                               
63 See US-Bahrain FTA, supra note 52, art.19.2.c. See US-Oman FTA, supra note 52, art.20.2.c. See also 
US-Morocco FTA, supra note 52, art.20.2.c. 
64 Chapter nineteen of the US-Canada FTA provides for an unprecedented binational dispute settlement 
panel in antidumping and countervailing duty cases. The panel will apply each country's antidumping and 
countervailing laws. See Rebecca A. Sanford, The Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement: Its Aspects, 
Highlights, and Probable Impact on Future Bilateral Trade and Trading Agreements, 7 Penn State 
International Law Review 371, 375 (1989). In the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), some 
chapters contain their own dispute resolution processes. Chapter 19 of NAFTA is dealing with antidumping 
and countervailing duty disputes. Chapter 19 of NAFTA establishes binational panels to review final 
determinations of antidumping and countervailing duty measures imposed under NAFTA parties’ national 
antidumping and countervailing duty law. For discussion of NAFTA’s dispute resolution processes under 
other than chapter 20 procedure see David S. Huntington, Settling Disputes Under the North American 
Free Trade Agreement, 43 HARV.INT’L L. J. 407, 430-436 (1993). See also David A. Gantz, The United 
States and NAFTA Dispute Settlement: Ambivalence, Frustration and Occasional Defiance (University of 
Arizona James E. Rogers College of Law, Discussion Paper No. 06–26 (2006).   
65 See US-JO FTA, United States (U.S.)-Jordan: Agreement Between The United States of America and the 
Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan on The Establishment of a Free Trade Area, supra n. 10, art. 10. The US-
Israel, US-Bahrain, and US-Morocco FTAs do not have specific provisions regarding antidumping and 
countervailing duties. Chapter eight of Chile-US FTA and Dominican Republic-Central American-US FTA 
reaffirm that each Party retains its WTO rights and obligations with regard to the application of 
antidumping and countervailing duties. The Chile-US FTA and Dominican Republic-Central American-US 
FTA also specify expressly that there are no rights or obligations created with respect to these measures, 
including recourse to dispute settlement procedures, under the respective FTAs. 
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       The US-JO FTA is silent regarding bilateral consultation or action on proposed 
legislations. By contrast, other U.S. FTAs with Arab countries provide explicitly that 
neither party can refer a matter concerning a "proposed measure" to a dispute settlement 
panel.66 In other words, these U.S. FTAs with Arab countries –excluding Jordan- do not 
accommodate requests for dispute panel regarding pending legislation in a partner 
country that is inconsistent with the FTA. The importance of excluding a "proposed 
measure" from the coverage of dispute settlement cannot be overstated. If such a 
"proposed measure" is entertained, this can lead to waste of resources for panels to 
consider measures that may never be enacted.67 
2. Establishment of a Panel and its Procedures 
 
       When bilateral consultations are exhausted, the matter is referred to the Joint 
Committee. Referring the matter to the Joint Committee provides the parties with another 
chance to negotiate and settle the matter. If the FTA Joint Committee does not resolve the 
dispute within ninety days, either party may refer the matter to an ad hoc dispute 
settlement panel.68 The system adopted by the US-JO FTA is quasi-judicial because it 
involves bilateral consultations within the Joint Committee and panels.69 In other words, 
the US-JO FTA adopted a hybrid system.  
       The panel consists of three members.70 Each party appoints one member.71 The 
remaining panelist- who serves as chairman- shall be selected by the mutual agreement of 
                                               
66 See US-Bahrain FTA, supra note 52, art.19.7.2. See US-Morocco FTA, supra note 52, art.20.7.2. See 
also US-Oman FTA, supra note 52, art.20.7.2. 
67 See Victoria Donaldson and Simon Lester, Dispute Settlement 385, in Bilateral and Regional Trade 
Agreements: Commentary and Analysis (Simon Lester and Brian Mercurio eds. 2009).  
68 See United States (U.S.)-Jordan: Agreement Between The United States of America and the Hashemite 
Kingdom of Jordan on The Establishment of a Free Trade Area, supra n. 10, art. 17.1.c. 
69 Id. arts. 17.1.b & c.  
70 Id. art. 17.1.c.  
71 Id. 
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the panelists already appointed. Thus, the disputing parties in the FTA cannot select the 
third panelist.  
       The FTA does not require notice to establish such a panel. The FTA does not 
prescribe a time limit within which the panel should be called or what happens in the case 
whereby the parties do not agree on the panel’s membership.72 According to the FTA, 
within 180 days of the entry into force of the FTA the parties should develop rules for the 
selection and conduct of the members of the panel and model rules of procedure for such 
panels.73 To date, no such rules were issued. By creating these rules, the FTA parties can 
determine the qualifications, expertise, nationality, and remuneration for panelists serving 
on a panel.74 Model rules of procedures may include policies, practices, and procedures 
for language(s) used, receiving initial and rebuttal written submissions, confidentiality of 
information, seeking information from different sources, and how oral hearings will be 
conducted before a panel.75 
       The US-JO FTA leaves many questions unanswered. For example, how large the 
panel roster, if any, in the US-JO FTA should be?76 How long should the panelist serve 
on the list? Should a panelist be full-time or part-time? Can private lawyer represent the 
                                               
72 The US-Israel FTA stipulates a time limit of forty-five days from the date of referral to establish a panel. 
See U.S.-Israel Free Trade Agreement, supra note 55, art. 19.1.d. Panel selection can take significant time. 
See David Gantz, The United States and NAFTA Dispute Settlement: Ambivalence, Frustration and 
Occasional Defiance, Arizona Legal Studies Discussion Paper 06-16, 13-15 (2009).  
73 See United States (U.S.)-Jordan: Agreement Between The United States of America and the Hashemite 
Kingdom of Jordan on The Establishment of a Free Trade Area, supra n. 10, art. 17.3. 
74 See Joost Pauwelyn, WTO Panelists are from Mars, ICSID Arbitrators are from Venus: Why? And Does 
it Matter? 7 (2015), available at < http://www.iilj.org/wp-
content/uploads/2016/09/PaulwelynIILJColloq2015.pdf > (last visited Dec. 25, 2017).  
75 Later U.S FTAs with Arab countries provide such policies. See US-Morocco FTA, supra note 52, 
art.20.8. See also US-Bahrain FTA, supra note 52, art.20.8. See also US-Bahrain FTA, supra note 52, 
art.19.8.  
76 The US-Morocco FTA establishes a reserve list of eight individuals who are willing and able to serve as 
panelists. Those individuals must be chosen strictly on the basis of objectivity, reliability, and sound 
judgment and have expertise or experience in law, international trade, or the resolution of disputes arising 
under international trade agreements. See US-Morocco FTA, supra note 52, art.20.7.5. See also US-Oman 
FTA, supra note 52, art.20.7.4. 
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government of Jordan in a dispute under the FTA or should he/she be a governmental 
lawyer? How many oral hearing(s) or written submission(s) each disputing party will be 
given as a due process mechanism? 
3. Panel's Report  
       Under the US-JO FTA there is only one final report. The US-JO FTA does not 
require that the panel issues an initial report on which both parties can comment on, as 
the case under the WTO.77 Therefore, under the US-JO FTA, the panel issues one final 
report. The FTA contains no specific provision on the method by which the panel is to 
render its report i.e. consensus or majority. This is presumably linked to the fact that 
model rules of procedure need to be developed. Further, it is unclear what the official 
language of the panel report is. The panel report might be in two copies, English and 
Arabic, which mean additional administrative and financial costs in drafting.  
       The panel’s report shall include "findings of facts" and a "determination" as to 
whether either party has failed to carry out its obligations under the FTA or a measure 
taken by either party severely distorts the balance of trade benefits or substantially 
undermines the fundamental objectives of the FTA.78 If the panel finds that a party has 
failed to carry out its obligations under the US-JO FTA, it may, at the request of the 
                                               
77 It is unfortunate setback that the US-JO FTA does not require an interim report issued by the panel and 
submitted to the parties for comments before it issues a final report. It is important to issue an interim 
report because the panel would prevent the parties from coming backing and accuse the panel of misstating 
their arguments, ignoring their point of view, substantive omissions, technical errors, or denying them the 
right to present their argument. Therefore, the panel by issuing an interim report would give the parties 
once and for all the last chance to present their comments. See Steve Charnovitz, Transparency and 
Participation in the World Trade Organization, 56 Rutgers L. Rev. 927, 940 (2004). The US-Oman FTA 
and US-Morocco FTA require the panels to issue an initial report and afford the opportunity to the parties 
to provide comments. See US-Oman FTA, supra note 52, art.20.9.3. See also US-Morocco FTA, supra 
note 52, art.20.9.3. 
78 See United States (U.S.)-Jordan: Agreement Between The United States of America and the Hashemite 
Kingdom of Jordan on The Establishment of a Free Trade Area, supra n. 10, art. 17.1.d. 
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parties, make recommendations for resolution of the dispute.79 The authority of the panel 
to make recommendations is qualified by request of both parties. In addition, the ability 
for the panel to make recommendations is limited to the instance whereby either party has 
failed to carry out its obligations under the FTA. The ability to make recommendations is 
not available in other instances i.e. measure taken severely distorts the balance of trade 
benefits or substantially undermining the fundamental objectives of the FTA. Where the 
panel is set to make recommendations, the FTA does not provide guidelines for the types 
of recommendation. The usual recommendation in this case would be to eliminate the 
non-conformity. 
       Although the panel’s report includes "findings of facts" and a "determination", 
nevertheless the US-JO FTA does not attend to the essential element of the report i.e. 
reasoning. In other words, the FTA does not require the panel to detail the reasons for its 
conclusions.80 It might be understandable that, in certain cases, a comprehensive 
presentation of the Panel's factual findings could make its conclusions reasonable. 
However, other cases could necessitate for the panel to validate its report with convincing 
reasons. 
       As the death knell to the legality of the panel process, the panel report is not 
binding.81 And, while one can speculate, one does not know, and perhaps would have 
                                               
79 Id. art. 17.1.d. 
80 See Gregory Shaffer, Manfred Elsig, Sergio Puig, The Extensive (but Fragile) Authority of the WTO 
Appellate Body, 79 Law and Contemporary Problems 238, 252-253 (2016) (The AB often adopted a 
technical, formalistic, and text-based approach, frequently citing dictionaries to support its reasoning. By 
wrapping their rulings in textual and technical reasoning and consensus decisions, the AB members 
enhance their authority as upholders of the law. The AB routinely and at times harshly overruled panels for 
deficiencies in their legal reasoning or their application of treaty interpretation techniques).  
81 This does not mean that the panel is ineffective, since even if its decision is considered legally binding 
either party may never comply. Both parties may comply with the panel’s decision because they want to 
avoid a reputation of being a rule breaker especially after a decision by neutral panel is made public. See 
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difficulty to learn, the rationale for the U.S. to change from legality in the WTO, which it 
fought hardly for, to diplomacy in the FTA.82 The panel’s report functions as conciliatory 
report. Therefore, the US-JO FTA panel is not supranational body. 
       The non-binding nature of a panel report creates its own set of unresolved questions. 
In particular, the non-binding panel report clashes with the forum-shopping provision in 
the US-JO FTA.83 If the language of the forum-shopping provision is interpreted 
narrowly, the U.S. or Jordan is forbidden from resorting to a binding dispute resolution 
mechanism. At the end of the other spectrum, the U.S. or Jordan can invoke any dispute 
resolution mechanism under similar international agreements. 
       The FTA requires the Joint Committee to resolve the dispute taken into account the 
panel report, as appropriate.84 This means that in most cases, the panel report will be 
taken into account. The panel decision represents an objective and articulate decision that 
would help resolve the dispute. Hence, it should be taken into account, otherwise the 
whole FTA would be at risk through non-compliance with panel decisions. Moreover, 
due to the publicity of the panel decision, the Joint Committee will face a pressure to 
                                                                                                                                            
United States (U.S.)-Jordan: Agreement Between The United States of America and the Hashemite 
Kingdom of Jordan on The Establishment of a Free Trade Area, supra n. 10, art. 17.1.d. 
82 Perhaps, the U.S. considered that in no way increase imports from Jordan would lead to trade disputes. In 
other words, the fact that the parties to the FTA are remote geographically or engaged in less trade merited 
the U.S. to sway from judicialized dispute settlement mechanism. Another speculation is that the U.S. 
feared that one time it might a respondent in a case rather than a complainant. On other hand, one can 
expect that Jordan, the weaker party, preferred a legalistic approach to preserve its rights in case of a 
violation. On other hand, one can expect that Jordan, the weaker party, preferred a legalistic approach to 
preserve its rights in case of a violation. See Michael Reisman and Mark Wiedman, Contextual Imperatives 
of Dispute Resolution Mechanisms: Some Hypotheses and Their Application in the Uruguay Round and 
NAFTA, 29.3 Journal of World Trade 5, 9 (1995) (developing countries prefer rule-based dispute settlement 
that as they lack international economic, political and legal influence).  
83 The US-Jo FTA provides that if a panel under FTA or any other applicable international dispute 
settlement mechanism has been invoked by either Party with respect to any matter, the mechanism invoked 
shall have exclusive jurisdiction over that matter. See United States (U.S.)-Jordan: Agreement Between 
The United States of America and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan on The Establishment of a Free Trade 
Area, supra n. 10, art. 17.1.e.1. 
84 Id. art. 17.2.a. 
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comply or take the report into account. Also, the publication of the panel’s report may 
generate sympathy that would pressure the opposing party to comply with the ruling 
risking rending the whole FTA ineffective. It will create guidance for future trade 
disputes.  
       The US-JO FTA fails to provide a process for appeal or review along the lines of the 
WTO's standing Appellate Body. The WTO's Appellate Body may be important in terms 
of assuring both consistency and fairness in a rule-based adjudicatory process.85 
However, since the decision of a US-FTA panel is not binding there is no need for 
appeal.  
 4. Implementation of Panel Report 
       Even if the panel makes it report, still the ultimate forum for resolving the dispute is 
through the Joint Committee. Once the final report is provided to the parties, the Joint 
Committee endeavors to resolve the dispute taking the report of the panel into account as 
appropriate.86  
       If the Joint Committee does not resolve the dispute, within thirty days from the date 
the panel presented its report, the affected party is entitled to take any "appropriate" and 
"commensurate" measure.87 It is notable that the FTA is absent any requirement on 
reporting of compliance or monitoring. The FTA establishes the right to take 
countermeasures unilaterally, without the authorization of the Joint Committee. On other 
hand, for example, the right to retaliate under WTO rules is subject to the approval of the 
                                               
85 See Mark Huber and Greg Tereposky, The WTO Appellate Body: Viability as a Model for an Investor–
State Dispute Settlement Appellate Mechanism, 32.3 ICSID Review - Foreign Investment Law Journal 545, 
560-562 (2017).   
86 See United States (U.S.)-Jordan: Agreement Between The United States of America and the Hashemite 
Kingdom of Jordan on The Establishment of a Free Trade Area, supra n. 10, art. 17.2.a. 
87 Id. art. 17.2.b. By contrast, the US-Morocco and US-Oman FTAs require the parties to enter into 
negotiations with a view to developing mutually acceptable compensation. See US-Morocco FTA, supra 
note 52, art.20.11.1. See also US-Oman FTA, supra note 52, art.20.11.1. 
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DSB.88 However, the right to take countermeasures, under the US-JO FTA, is contingent 
upon exhaustion of consultations, panel procedures, and Joint Committee deliberations.   
       The use of the term "commensurate" and "appropriate" emphasizes that the measure 
taken must be in proportion to the violation.89 The US-JO FTA does not provide guidance 
as to the meaning of "appropriate and commensurate" measures. Moreover, the US-JO 
FTA does not determine if the "appropriate and commensurate" measures must be in the 
same sector as affected by the measure or can extend to other sectors. In some cases, 
taking "appropriate and commensurate" measures in the same sector affected by the 
measure may not be plausible.  
       The US-JO FTA does not specify the case where the losing party believes that the 
"appropriate" and "commensurate" measure taken is excessive. It seems logical, in this 
scenario, for the losing party to request the same dispute settlement panel to convene to 
determine the level of the measure. However, any review of the measures' level comes 
after the fact. In other words, the review of the measures' level comes after the measure 
has actually been applied. 
       In theory, the dispute settlement process under the US-JO FTA takes approximately 
nine months to conclude.90 The table below shows the timeline of the dispute settlement 
process. 
 
                                               
88 See Cherie O’Neal Taylor, Beyond Retaliation, 38 Nw. J. Int'l L. & Bus. 55, 64-65 (2017). 
89 The use of these terms in the US-JO FTA is in contrast with the language used by the WTO whereby the 
level of suspension of concessions shall be equivalent to the level of nullification or impairment. Id. at 113.  
90 It is not unusual for specific dispute settlement process deadlines to be disregarded in certain cases for 
many factors such as the significance of the case, political ramification, and lack of resources to draft panel 
reports on time. See James C. Hartigan (ed.), Trade Disputes and the Trade Dispute Settlement 
Understanding of the WTO: An Interdisciplinary Assessment 3, 139 (2009). See also Claus-Dieter 
Ehlermann, The Workload of the WTO Appellate Body: Problems and Remedies, 20.3 Journal of 
International Economic Law 705, 713 (2017).  
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60 days                              Bilateral Consultations 
90 days                             Joint Committee Consultations (extend or shorten this period)            
90 days                              Panel Report 
30 days                              Joint Committee Endeavor after Panel Report 
No Time Limit                  Appropriate and Commensurate Measure              
5. Transparency 
       The FTA has a side understanding on transparency in the dispute settlement 
mechanism.91 The FTA requires the publication of parties' written submissions.92 The 
FTA also requires the oral hearings of the parties be open to the public. By opening the 
dispute settlement process to the public, the US-JO FTA opened the closed doors of panel 
chambers to the public and uncovered the veil of secrecy.93 Publication of a panel's report 
is essential for securing the compliance of the losing party. Publication of the report 
makes it possible for the winning party- even if that party is much smaller and weaker 
than the losing party- to create public opinion among other countries.  
        The FTA allows for acceptance and consideration of amicus curia briefs.94 Under 
the US-JO FTA, a panel is “obliged” to accept and consider amicus curia of whatever 
                                               
91 See Memorandum of Understanding on Transparency in Dispute Settlement under the Agreement 
between the United States and Jordan on the Establishment of a Free Trade Area at 
<http://www.ustr.gov/regions/eu-med/middleeast/memodis.pdf>.  
92 Para. 2.a. Id. See US-Morocco FTA, supra note 52, art.20.8.c. See also US-Bahrain FTA, supra note 52, 
art.19.8.c. See also US-Oman FTA, supra note 52, art.20.8.c.  
93 The US-Israel FTA does not provide for the publication of the panel’s report. See U.S.-Israel Free Trade 
Agreement, supra note 55, art. 19.  
94 For more on amicus curiae see Padideh Ala’i, Judicial Lobbying At the WTO: The Debate over the Use of 
Amicus Curiae Briefs and the U.S. Experience, 24 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 62, 67, 84, 86 (2000) (stating 
that the solitary support of the U.S. for amicus curiae submissions before the WTO Appellate Body can be 
attributed to the U.S. legal system’s historical familiarity with the institution of amicus curiae and its 
evolution from “friend of the court” to a “judicial lobbyist” within the U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence. 
The function of amicus curiae at common law was one of oral shepardizing or the bringing up of cases not 
known to the judge. The amicus curiae first appeared on the U.S. scene in 1821 in Green v. Biddle case).   
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type filed by individuals, legal persons, and non-governmental organizations.95 Thus, 
accepting amicus curiae brief is mandated under the understanding no matter what type 
this brief is or whether it addresses factual or legal information. The only qualification for 
amicus curia submissions is the fact that these non-governmental organizations must 
have interest in the outcome of the dispute.96 There are no further details required for 
amicus curia submissions such as declaring source of funding, nature of non-
governmental organizations’ activities, time limits for submissions, size and content of 
submissions, and how such submissions would add value to the knowledge of the panel. 
At any rate, considering and accepting amicus curiae brief n the panel proceedings will 
add complexity to the panel process. 
6. Forum Shopping 
       The US-JO FTA determines the litigating forum for a dispute.97 The U.S. or Jordan 
can forum shop a dispute mechanism of their choice to resolve the dispute with an 
exclusionary clause. Once either party invokes dispute settlement mechanism of certain 
forum this will function to exclude that party from invoking the same subject matter 
before another forum. For example, the U.S. or Jordan can resort to the WTO dispute 
settlement mechanism to resolve their dispute rather than to the dispute settlement 
mechanism under the US-JO FTA.  
                                               
95 See Memorandum of Understanding on Transparency in Dispute Settlement under the Agreement 
between the United States and Jordan on the Establishment of a Free Trade Area, supra n. 42, para. 2.c. 
96 Id. 
97 The US-JO FTA states that if the dispute settlement panel under the agreement or any other applicable 
international dispute settlement mechanism has been invoked by either Party with respect to any matter, the 
mechanism invoked shall have exclusive jurisdiction over that matter. See United States (U.S.)-Jordan: 
Agreement Between The United States of America and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan on The 
Establishment of a Free Trade Area, supra n. 10, art. 17.1.e.1. 
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       In the US-JO FTA, priority is given to the dispute settlement procedures under the 
WTO in certain cases. These cases involve services and intellectual property.98 In other 
words, disputes regarding trade in services and intellectual property can be referable to 
the panel procedures under that FTA only if they are not subject to resolution under the 
WTO dispute settlement mechanism.  
       Choosing such a forum is limited to the extent that the "subject matter" of the dispute 
is covered by both the US-JO FTA and the WTO Agreements. In other words, if Jordan 
fails to carry out its obligation under the e-commerce provision, the U.S. might not be 
able to refer the matter to the WTO since the WTO agreements, as of this date, do not 
cover e-commerce.99  This is supported by subparagraph 4.b of article 17 of the US-JO 
FTA allows a party to invoke the panel procedures for claim regarding intellectual 
property rights to extent that such a claim is not covered under the DSU of the WTO.             
       The forum shopping opportunity seems to define more clearly the right of a party to 
recourse to US-JO FTA forum or other fora. However, in practice, the forum shopping 
provisions may give rise to many problems. For instance, there could be disagreement 
over Jordan’s choice of forum, or the decision of a panel under the US-JO FTA could 
differ from that reached under the WTO.100  
                                               
98 Subparagraph 17.4.a of the FTA provides “A Party may invoke a panel under paragraph 1.c of this 
Article for claims arising under Article 3 [services] only to the extent that a claim arises with regard to a 
commitment that is inscribed in the Party’s Services Schedule to Annex 3.1 to this Agreement, but is not 
inscribed in the Party’s Schedule of specific commitments annexed to GATS. Such commitment may 
include a market access or national treatment commitment in a sector, a horizontal commitment applicable 
to a sector, or additional commitment”. Additionally, subparagraph 17.4.b provides “Except as otherwise 
agreed by the Parties, a Party may invoke a panel under paragraph 1.c of this Article for claims arising 
under Article 4 [intellectual property] only to the extent that the same claim would not be subject to 
resolution through the WTO Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of 
Disputes”.   
99 If a dispute settlement mechanism under the FTA or other forum failed for "procedural" or 
"jurisdictional" reasons, this shall not prevent either party from invoking the other forum. Id. art. 17.1.e.ii.   
100 See Marc L. Busch, Overlapping Institutions, Forum Shopping, and Dispute Settlement in International 
Trade, 61 International Organization 735 738-740 (2007). 
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7. Private Actions 
       The US-JO FTA dispute resolution mechanism provides standing solely to the 
parties. Private actions against another party on the grounds that a measure of another 
party is inconsistent with the FTA are prohibited.101 This reflects long-standing U.S. 
policy and language found in legislation that approves trade agreements.102 By contrast, 
foreign investors can initiate claims against the host government.103 These claims cover 
wide range of actions or inactions such as measures relating to taxation, environmental 
regulation, among other issues.  
       Even though the US-JO FTA was concluded for the benefit of manufacturers and 
entrepreneurs, the agreement does not provide private right of action. This means that 
manufacturers and importers alike cannot rely on their respective governments to initiate 
dispute resolution proceedings under the US-JO FTA. 
       The private right of action in US-JO FTA is significant for Jordan. Jordan follows 
the monist system, in which treaties are fully self-executing whereby which once 
approved and in force, treaties automatically have direct applicability by government 
agencies, courts, and private parties, even where they create conflicts with existing 
legislations.104 Trade agreements in Jordan are automatically the law of the land. Thus, 
                                               
101 See United States (U.S.)-Jordan: Agreement Between The United States of America and the Hashemite 
Kingdom of Jordan on The Establishment of a Free Trade Area, supra n. 10, art. 18.1. 
102 See Nohl Patrick Bryant, Private Rights of Action Under Free Trade Agreement Implementation Acts, 
LLM Thesis, The George Washington University Law School 20-28 (2013). 
103 See David R. Haigh, Chapter 11--Private Party vs. Governments, Investor-State Dispute Settlement: 
Frankenstein or Safety Valve, 26 Can.-U.S. L.J. 115, 116-118 (2000). 
104 The monist theory asserts that domestic and international law are two components of a single body of 
knowledge called law. the main features of this theory are the unity of the international and domestic law, 
the automatic incorporation of international law into domestic law, and the supremacy of international law 
over domestic law in cases of conflict between the two. Dualists regard international law and domestic law 
as two completely different systems of law. The result of this is that international human rights norms 
ratified by dualist states are not enforceable until they have been incorporated or transformed into domestic 
law. See Martin Dixon, Textbook on International Law 64-70 (2013). Israel case law is inspired by the U.S. 
dualist approach. See Ruth Lapidoth, International Law Within The Israeli Legal System, 24 IS. L. R. 451, 
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trade agreements could be the basis of private citizen actions charging the government 
with failing to implement the agreements unless there are provisions in these trade 
agreements excluding such legal actions. 
V. Special Rules for Labor and Environmental Disputes  
       For the first time in U.S. trade history, the US-JO FTA included provisions that 
address environment and labor in the main text of the agreement.105 While the US-JO 
FTA includes specific references to environment in various different articles, articles 5 
and 6 are the main environmental provision.106 The US-JO FTA mandates that each party 
shall strive not to waive or derogate from environmental and labor laws as an 
encouragement of trade with each other and to provide high levels of environmental and 
labor protection.107 
       The panel's jurisdiction over labor and environmental issues is narrower than other 
actions inconsistent with the US-JO FTA. Not every failure to enforce environmental or 
labor law constitutes grounds for initiating dispute settlement. Rather, the obligation is as 
                                                                                                                                            
458-460 (1990) (The Israeli Supreme Court declared the dualist nature of the Israeli legal system in the 
case of Custodian of Absentee Property v. Samarah et al of 1956 in which the respondents tried to rely on 
the General Armistice Agreement between Israel and Jordan of 1949 to claim certain rights to property. 
The Court stated that such a treaty is no way within the jurisdiction of the courts in Israel unless and to the 
extent the treaty or the rights and obligations it entails have gone through "the melting pot" of the 
legislation of Israel and have assumed the form of binding law). 
105 NAFTA contains environmental protection provisions in a side agreement, known as the North 
American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation (NAAEC). See Howard Mann, NAFTA and the 
Environment: Lessons for the Future, 13 Tul. Envt. L.J. 387, 409 (2000) (suggesting that the impact of 
trade agreements on sustainable development requires that the environment be treated as an issue that is 
“over here”, inside the agreement, not “over there” in another agreement). See also Jerome Levinson, 
Certifying International Worker Rights: A Practical Alternative, 20 Comp. Lab. L. & Policy 401, 405 
(1999) (arguing that incorporating worker rights into the main body of multilateral agreements has reached 
a dead end. The only path to progress now is unilateral actions on the part of the U.S. The more effective 
way is to resort to aggressive unilateral action).   
106 For example, the U.S. and Jordan may exclude from patentability certain inventions to avoid prejudice 
to the environment. Additionally, the FTA incorporates by reference article XX of GATT 1994 including 
environmental measures necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health and measures relating to 
the conservation of “living and non-living” exhaustible natural resources. See United States (U.S.)-Jordan: 
Agreement Between The United States of America and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan on The 
Establishment of a Free Trade Area, supra n. 10, arts. 4.18 & 12.1.    
107 Id. arts. 5.1 & 5.2, 6.1 & 6.2. 
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follows: A Party shall not fail to effectively enforce its environmental and labor laws 
through a "sustained or recurring course of action or inaction in a manner affecting 
trade".108 Thus, the dispute settlement provisions can be invoked only if party's own 
environmental or labor laws are not be enforced rather than whether they meet 
international standards.  
       The US-JO FTA provides a two-prong test. This test requires a "sustained or 
recurring course of action or inaction" in a manner affecting trade between the parties. 
The FTA does not define the terms "sustained or recurring." Although "sustained or 
recurring" implies something that happens more than one time, the definition may not be 
settled so easily. The second-prong of the test requires that the sustained action/inaction 
be in a manner that affects trade. This prong determines what violation is actionable or 
non-actionable. Only sustained action or inaction that "affects" trade is actionable. The 
second-prong of the test ensures that environmental obligations are linked to trade in a 
manner that would otherwise be considered an intrusion into the domestic arena of the 
FTA parties. 
       The U.S.-JO FTA establishes a single dispute settlement mechanism for all disputes 
under the agreement.109 Parties to the U.S.-JO FTA can arguably impose trade sanctions 
for failure to enforce environmental or labor protection. To ease concerns regarding 
imposing trade sanctions for environmental violations, the U.S. and Jordan exchange side 
letters, whereby both parties expressed their intention not to exercise trade sanctions for 
                                               
108 Id. art. 5.3.a. 
109 The US-Oman FTA requires that panelists have expertise in labor or environmental matter. See US-
Oman FTA, supra note 52, art. 27.4.c. 
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these violations.110 Insulating labor and environmental violations from trade sanctions 
was one of the more controversial aspects of the US-JO FTA.111 The exchange of letters 
paved the way for the Congress's approval of the FTA with Jordan. 
       In 2006, the U.S. complained about worker's rights in Jordan and requested 
consultations regarding the failure to investigate alleged labor abuses and failure to 
protect workers.112 Extensive meetings were held with Jordanian government officials, 
representatives from labor unions and worker rights advocates as well as business 
groups.113 The U.S and Jordan started a Better Work program to observe workers' 
conditions in Jordan.  
       The U.S. FTAs with Oman, Bahrain, and Morocco follow the same standards and 
procedures as the US-JO FTA. However, these former FTAs impose fines –capped at US 
$15 million as adjusted for inflation- in case of violation.114 Fines are collected through 
suspension of concessions, if necessary, and are spent on labor or environmental 
initiatives in the territory of the party complained against.  
                                               
110 On July 23, 2001, former USTR Robert Zoellick and Jordan’s ambassador to the U.S. exchanged letters. 
These identical letters pledged to resolve any differences that might arise between the two countries under 
the agreement, without recourse to formal dispute settlement procedures. They also specified that each 
government “would not expect or intend to apply the Agreement’s dispute settlement enforcement 
procedures ... in a manner that results in blocking trade. See USTR, Side Letters, available at < 
https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/jordan-fta/final-text > (last visited January 15, 
2018).  
111 During the Senate debate, Senator Phil Gramm warned that he will oppose any effort to 
turn the US-JO FTA into a model for how future trade agreements should deal with environmental and 
labor rights. See Grary G. Yerkey, USTR Says Bush Administration Supports U.S.-Jordan Free Trade 
Agreement “as it is,” 18 Intl. Trade Rep. (BNA) 1013 (June 28, 2001) (Sen. Grassley suggested attaching 
"side letters" to the agreement in which the United States and Jordan promise not to use sanctions to 
enforce labor and environmental provisions of the accord). See also Nancy Ognanovich, Bush Tells 
Abdullah He Will Push Hill to Adopt Jordan Free-Trade Agreement, 18 Intl. Trade Rep. (BNA) 632 (Apr. 
19, 2001) (Jordanians indicated that they are going to leave that [specifics of environmental and labor 
provisions] to the [U.S.] administration to work with Congress directly).   
112 See Steven Greenhouse and Michael Barbaro, An Ugly Side of Free Trade: Sweatshops in Jordan, New 
York Times (May 3, 2006).  
113 See USTR, Jordan Free Trade Agreement, available at < https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-
agreements/jordan-fta>.  
114 See US-Bahrain FTA, supra note 52, Annex 19.A. See also US-Morocco FTA, supra note 52, Annex 
20.A. See also US-Oman FTA, supra note 52, Annex 20.A.  
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VI. Assessment of Dispute Settlement Mechanism under US-JO FTA  
       The procedures of dispute settlement under the US-JO FTA, though contains some 
improvements than the US-Israel FTA, to some extent does not offer potent means for 
resolving disputes such as that of the WTO. The US-JO FTA is akin, more or less, to the 
early years of the GATT 1994 where diplomacy ruled over legality.115 The US-JO FTA's 
dispute settlement mechanism should have been strengthened since it will serve as a 
model for the proposed US-Middle East FTA.116 The latter FTA should provide a 
framework for the establishment of a detailed potent and comprehensive dispute 
settlement mechanism.  
       It is difficult to evaluate the effectiveness of the dispute settlement mechanism under 
the US-JO FTA, since data is absent to show how many disputes were settled through 
consultations, brought before panels, or withdrawn.117 This hints that the dispute system 
of the US-JO FTA is non-or under-utilized. Therefore, development of the US-JO FTA 
                                               
115 There was a view that dispute settlement under the GATT should be a natural consequence of the 
negotiation process. Some countries highlighted the ambiguity of GATT rules, the political sensitivity of 
trade disputes, and the complex trade-offs of competing interests that go into the formulation of any trade 
rule. Thus, they argued that GATT dispute resolution should not be formal, legal, or adjudicatory. See 
David K. Tarullo, Logic, Myth and International Economic Order, 26 HARV. INT’L L. J. 533 (1985). 
Other countries, such as the U.S., viewed the dispute system under the GATT as rule-based system in 
which violations are exposed and subject to sanctions. In the U.S. view, GATT rules will become clearer 
and predictable if GATT dispute resolution is characterized by rule-based decisions rendered through an 
adjudicatory dispute resolution process, will increase compliance with GATT standards, and will alleviate 
protectionist pressures. See JOHN H. JACKSON ET AL., LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL 
ECONOMIC RELATION 339 (1995). 
116 President Bush announced the U.S. intent to launch a 10-year effort to form a US-Middle East free trade 
area. See Mike Allen & Karen DeYoung, Bush Calls Trade Key To Mideast; President launches Plan For 
U.S. Pact in Region, Wash. Post, May 10, 2003, at A01. See also Grary G. Yerkey, President Bush Lays 
Out Broad Plan for Regional FTA with Middle East by 2013, 20 Int’l. Trade Rep. (BNA) 856 (May. 15, 
2003) (stating that the U.S. will employ a “building-block” approach. This approach requires, as a first step, 
a Middle East country to accede to the WTO or concluding Trade and Investment Framework 
Agreement(s) (“TIFA”). Afterward, the U.S. will negotiate FTA with individual countries. Finally, 
preferably before 2013, a critical mass of bilateral FTAs would come together to form the broader US-
Middle East FTA). See also Bessma Momani, A Middle East Free Trade Area: Economic Interdependence 
and Peace Considered, 30 The World Economy 1682, 1686 (2007). Until now, the proposal of US-Middle 
East FTA has not materialized. 
117 WTO panel reports are always published. See WTO, Dispute Settlement- Disputes by Members < 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_by_country_e.htm> (last visited Jan. 10, 2018).  
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jurisprudence is lacking and there are no precedents to which the parties in the future will 
observe. Difficulties in the interpretation and application of the FTA would ultimately 
arise. However, despite the fact that the dispute settlement provisions under the US-JO 
FTA represent to some degree an interesting language, it is doubtful that they will be 
used.118 The U.S. would not like to be described as a bully against a small country like 
Jordan and would find it difficult to justify such appropriate and commensurate action 
vis-à-vis the international trade society at large. 
        Frequency of trade disputes between the U.S. and Jordan are associated with 
economic size and trade share.119 Another reason that may explain the non-existence of 
dispute settlement panels under the US-JO FTA is the fact that the WTO dispute 
settlement procedure mostly covers disputes regarding trade. Many FTAs state dispute 
settlement procedures are not as frequent as investor-state disputes.120  
       The FTA Joint Committee cannot force the offending country to remove the measure 
or pass an order to stop the measure from running. If a panel finds that the U.S. is in 
violation of its obligations under the US-JO FTA and the U.S. does not comply, Jordan - 
at least on paper - may be to retaliate by imposing trade sanctions against the U.S. 
However, imposing higher tariffs on intermediate manufactured imports from the U.S. 
                                               
118 The use of dispute settlement mechanism in FTAs depends on many factors. The absence of secretariat 
support in the FTA affects the operation of the dispute settlement mechanism while the WTO system 
enjoys reliable logistical support from well-organized staff members. See Overview of the WTO 
Secretariat, available at < https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/secre_e/intro_e.htm > (last visited Feb. 1, 
2018) (The WTO Secretariat has 634 regular staff. The Secretariat provides legal assistance in the dispute 
settlement process. The Appellate Body has its own Secretariat).     
119 See Bashar H. Malkawi, Arab Countries’ (Under) Participation in the WTO Dispute Settlement 
Mechanism, 14 Flinders Law Journal 1, 7-8 (2012). Jordan, Morocco, and Oman do not make the list of top 
trading partners with the U.S. See U.S. Census Bureaeu, Top Trading Partners 2017, available at 
<https://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/statistics/highlights/top/index.html>.   
120 In NAFTA as an example, of the total 119 cases which have been referred for dispute settlement 
procedures, 3 have been cases of state-to-state dispute settlement under chapter 20. See NAFTA 
Secretariat, Decisions and Reports, available at < https://www.nafta-sec-alena.org/Home/Dispute-
Settlement/Decisions-and-Reports > (last visited Dec. 11, 2017).   
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could be detrimental to Jordan's economy welfare in general.121 To reduce the problem of 
enforcement, the US-JO FTA should be revised by introducing alternatives to retaliation 
such as financial damages. Until a more plausible solution is invented, Jordan will find it 
sensible not to spend time and cost on a complaint in anticipation of its inability to enforce 
even a positive panel ruling. 
Conclusions 
       A strong dispute resolution mechanism is a core component of FTAs which must 
provide a reliable and stable venue to address meritorious claims and deliver enforceable 
results and demonstrates the commitments of each government to comply with the 
contractual obligations.  Without this commitment, businesses will be reluctant to risk 
capital. 
       The U.S. concluded an FTA with Jordan for diverse reasons within the economic and 
geopolitical contexts. The current dispute settlement mechanism in the US-JO FTA has 
rarely if ever been invoked and should be modified to reflect legal developments as well 
as the possible use as a template for a comprehensive US-Middle East FTA. In making 
these suggested improvements, we take into account the marked disparity in both hard 
and soft power as well as economic resources between the parties to encourage FTA 
utilization and participation and promote the gains to a developing country such as 
Jordan. Since 2000s, the U.S. concluded other FTAs with Bahrain, Oman, and Morocco. 
These FTAs were negotiated and concluded around the same time approximately; 
therefore key characters of the dispute resolution provisions are similarly formulated. 
        
                                               
121 Developing country retaliatory measure(s) against a developed country, such as the US or EU, is highly 
likely to have a relatively small impact on the economies of these developed countries. See Bashar H. 
Malkawi, supra note 111, at 18.   
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       The U.S. FTAs with Arab countries share some commonalities. For example, The 
U.S FTAs with Arab countries address disputes between the parties arising from the 
application or interpretation of the agreements or compliance with treaty obligations. In 
addition, these FTAs establish Joint Committees and sub-committees of various types to 
discuss issues of reciprocal interests, one of which is to resolve disagreements between 
the parties. Nevertheless, the specific terms and conditions of the dispute resolution 
provisions vary especially in the US-JO FTA.  
       The US-JO FTA clearly differs from other U.S. FTAs with Arab countries. The U.S. 
free trade agreements with Oman, Bahrain, and Morocco in some parts improve upon the 
dispute resolution mechanism in the US-JO FTA. These differences reflect political and 
economic factors underlying every agreement and the relationships between the parties. 
In addition, it seems that the U.S. opted for new experiments in recent FTAs with Arab 
countries to address some of the problems existing in the WTO in an innovative mode 
such as requiring financial compensation for non-compliance. 
       The US-JO FTA does not provide accelerated consultation period for cases involving 
perishable goods. The US-JO FTA is silent regarding bilateral consultation or action on 
proposed legislations. Also, The FTA does not prescribe a time limit within which the 
panel should be called or what happens in the case whereby the parties do not agree on 
the panel's membership. Under the US-JO FTA, there is only one final report. The US-JO 
FTA does not require that the panel issues an initial report on which both parties can 
comment. The panel report is not binding. The US-JO FTA did not provide a process for 
appeal or review along the lines of the WTO's standing Appellate Body.  
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       The US-JO FTA was affected by U.S. policy regarding environment and labor. These 
issues were included in the FTA. As a result, dispute settlement mechanisms came to be 
applied to labor and environmental obligations as well. However, the panel's jurisdiction 
over labor and environmental issues is narrower than other actions inconsistent with the 
US-JO FTA. Not every failure to enforce environmental or labor law constitutes grounds 
for initiating dispute settlement. Rather, the FTA parties should not fail to effectively 
enforce their environmental and labor laws through a sustained or recurring course of 
action or inaction in a manner affecting trade. 
       The dispute settlement mechanism in the US-JO FTA can be improved in several 
concrete ways. These improvements will address potential concerns and should 
contribute to a higher utilization of the FTA as well as serve as a template for a more 
expansive US-led regional FTA. While trade between the U.S. and Jordan remains 
modest, economies develop and disputes under the US-JO may become more likely in the 
future. 
 
